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COMMENT
NAFTA: A Catalyst for Environmental
Change in Mexico
MICHAEL D. MADNICK
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is
first and foremost an economic treaty designed to foster eco-
nomic expansion. NAFTA has been drafted with the intent
of maximizing economic growth while retaining a "green
character." NAFTA is the catalyst for a sounder Mexican
environmental program. Its signing into law on December
8, 1993, will ensure the substantive commitments made by
the United States and Mexico for a better environment.
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I. Introduction
Economic survival for a nation in today's global economy
is not an easy task. Increased competition and protective
trade barriers mandate that nations carefully guard their in-
dustries. To this end, nations have long entered into bilateral
or multilateral economic agreements of one sort or another.
In recent times, these agreements have taken the form of free
trade blocs favorable to its members and restrictive to the
rest of the world. The clearest example of this has been the
European Economic Community, which, if fully implemented,
will effectively eliminate most trade barriers currently ex-
isting among its members. To sustain economic development,
the United States, Canada and Mexico have created the
world's largest trading bloc, better known as the North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),'
signed into law by President Clinton on December 8, 1993, is
first and foremost an economic treaty designed to foster eco-
nomic expansion. Its objectives are to eliminate trade barri-
ers, promote fair competition and further investment
opportunity.2
The past, however, has shown that economic growth ab-
sent consideration of environmental consequences cannot
only harm our environment, but slow down the very economic
progress sought.3 As a result, recent years have been marked
by a gradual admission that global trade and the environ-
ment are unavoidably linked.4
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 15, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can.
1992 [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, U.S.-MEx.-CAN. 1 (Aug. 12, 1992).
3. Environmental degradation on the Mexican side of the border, resulting
from rapid expansion absent environmental considerations over the last dec-
ade, provides the clearest example of the consequences of fast economic growth
without an environmental plan.
4. WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, STATEMENT OF KATHRYN S. FULLER, PRESIDENT
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND TO THE SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE, COMM. ON
FINANCE, U.S. SENATE, 102d CONG., 2d SEss. 2 (Sept. 16, 1992) [hereinafter
STATEMENT OF KATHRYN S. FULLER].
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In keeping with the momentum of harmonizing economic
and environmental development, NAFTA has been drafted
with the intent of maximizing economic growth while retain-
ing a "green character." The agreement recognizes that
United States and Mexican environmental standards have
not been equivalent in the past. The United States has made
it clear that an environmentally soft Mexico is not in its eco-
nomic interest and in recognition of this reality, NAFTA's
economic provisions are sensitive to environmental issues.
Further, the Mexican government, as will be discussed,
has already made enormous strides in its environmental con-
trols in anticipation of NAFTA's approval. Because the eco-
nomic growth which NAFTA promises to bring is the best
way to improve the Mexican economy and standard of living,
NAFTA provides essential mechanisms for continued im-
provement of Mexico's environmental condition.
Detractors of NAFTA live in fear of consequences they
feel are inevitable. Yet, the consequences they envision exist
today. The U.S.- Mexican border is already in dire environ-
mental condition and American manufacturing jobs are being
lost as companies move south of the border. Up to now, both
of these trends have gone unchecked. NAFTA negotiations
have, and its implementation will, serve as a catalyst to im-
prove environmental conditions of the border region. NAFTA
is the catalyst for a sounder Mexican environmental pro-
gram. Preserving the status quo would have been the sole
achievement had NAFTA's detractors prevented its passage.
As this comment will illustrate, in NAFTA lies the most
realistic hope for two groups usually at opposite ends of a
spectrum. For the environmentalist, decades of environmen-
tal inaction in Mexico will cease, and the border region will
benefit as a result. For the business sector, decades of closed
markets and trade imbalances will cease, with the potential
for unparalleled growth.
In this comment, Part II provides a brief sketch of what
NAFTA is. Part III will address pertinent environmental is-
sues presently confronting the United States-Mexican Bor-
der. Part IV will address relevant environmental provisions
of NAFTA. Part V will examine the implementation program
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/9
of the Integrated Environmental Plan For The Mexican-U.S.
Border Area. Part VI will outline the key provisions of the
Environmental Side Agreement passed in September of 1993.
A discussion follows in Part VII regarding the viability of
NAFTA provisions, of implementation programs of the Inte-
grated Environmental Plan and of the Environmental Side
Agreements, as well as the substantive manner in which they
all address environmental concerns created by a possible
North American Free Trade Agreement.
II. What is NAFTA? What Will it Do?
To better understand why environmental issues are so
tied to NAFTA's success, a general understanding of the
scope and aims of NAFTA is useful. First, the sheer mass of a
NAFTA: the U.S./Canada/Mexico bloc is the largest free trade
zone on Earth, with 360 million people and an estimated com-
bined gross national product (GNP) of over $6 trillion
dollars.5
For years, Mexico has been a major trading partner of
the United States. Today, Mexico is our third largest trading
partner.6 Trade barriers established by the Mexicans have,
however, limited America's ability to reach the Mexican mar-
ket. Through NAFTA, in the next ten to fifteen years, most
U.S.-Mexican tariffs will be phased out.7 The treaty also en-
sures that goods from all three member nations be given
treatment equal to that treatment afforded equivalent do-
mestic goods of other member nations.8 NAFTA establishes
five trade assurances that will greatly enhance the fluidity
and ease of trade in North America: 1) nondiscriminatory
treatment; 2) freedom from performance requirements; 3)
free transference of investment funds; 4) expropriation only
in conformity with international law; and 5) the ability to
5. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREE-
MENT: ASSESSMENT OF MAJOR ISSUES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 2 (Sept.
1993) [hereinafter ASSESSMENT].
6. HOUSE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE, ISSUE BRIEF, NAFTA: SUMMARY AND
ANALYSIS 2 (Sept. 13, 1993) [hereinafter SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS].
7. Id.
8. Id. at 3.
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seek international arbitration for any violation of the
agreement.9
The result of such principles is enormous. NAFTA will
enable U.S. businesses, for the first time in decades, to own
majority interests in corporations and investment services
such as banks and insurance providers that are located in
Mexico. 10 This will give U.S. entrepreneurs an opportunity to
create footholds in Mexico and to more efficiently serve a new
consumer region.
Many fear that U.S. companies will move their opera-
tions from the U.S. to Mexico to take advantage of cheaper
costs and lax environmental standards. However, as the pro-
visions that follow indicate, this is not the likely consequence
of NAFTA. The more likely consequence of NAFTA is that
U.S. investors will expand their businesses: keeping their
American operations to service the northern region of North
America, and opening new operations to service the southern
region of North America.
Already, the expectations of NAFTA have caused enor-
mous growth in U.S.-Mexican trade. 1991 marked the first
year in several in which the U.S. had a trade surplus with
Mexico. Since 1986, U.S. exports to Mexico have risen from
$11.9 billion to $40.6 billion in 1992; a 350% increase. 1 '
Because of NAFTA's potential for tremendous growth,
assessing existing environmental problems and formulating a
plan to manage future growth is essential. As the following
sections will show, member states have squarely met this
challenge and have incorporated specific measures to prepare
for, and grow with NAFTA.
III. Environmental Issues of the Border Area
The border area of the United States and Mexico consists
of heavily populated "sister city" areas, separated by sparsely
9. ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at 5.
10. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS, supra note 6, at 3.
11. Id. at 2.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/9
populated and under-developed land.12 Sister cities are par-
allel cities on opposite sides of the United States-Mexican
border.13 Seventy-two percent of the border area's population
consists of fourteen pairs of sister cities. 14 Sixty percent of
this population growth has occurred within the last ten years,
and the population of this region now stands at nine mil-
lion.15 The largest of the sister cities include: San Diego/Ti-
juana; Calexico/Mexicali; Nogales/Nogales; and El Paso/
12. SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO URBANo Y ECOLOGIA (SEDUE), U.S. ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, (EPA), INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN
FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA (FIRST STAGE 1992-94) II-6 [hereinafter
BORDER PLAN].
13.
UNITED STATES
Califomia
Texas
-MEXICO
Mexican-U.S. Border Area
Showing "Sister-Cities'
14. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at H-6.
15. Id.
Coahuila
1993] NAFTA 371
7
372 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.11
Ciudad Juarez."6 It is in the sister cities that rapid population
growth coupled with inadequate environmental policies have
created the greatest environmental concern. 17 The environ-
16. Id. at H-7. The following table provides a complete list of the "sister
cities," as well as their respective populations.
1990 Populations of Border Sister Cities
Metropolitan Area City
Tijuana, Baja California 742,686 688,690
San Diego, California 2,498,016 1,110,549
Mexicali, Baja California 602,390 438,303
Calexico, California 109,303 18,633
San Luis Rio Colorado, Sonora 111,508 105,933
Yuma, Arizona 106,895 54,923
Nogales, Sonora 107,119 102,124
Nogales, Arizona 29,676 19,489
Agua Prieta, Sonora 39,045 32,778
Douglas, Arizona 97,624 17,324
Naco, Sonora 4,636 3,906
Naco, Arizona 97,624 675
Las Palomas, Chihuahua 16,565 2,500
Columbus, New Mexico 18,110 641
Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua 797,679 787,788
El Paso, Texas 591,610 515,342
Ojinaga, Chihuahua 23,947 6,637
Presidio, Texas 20,972 3,072
Ciudad Acuna, Coahuila 56,750 52,983
Del Rio, Texas 138,721 30,705
Piedras Negras, Coahuila 98,177 20,651
Eagle Pass, Texas 36,378 96,178
Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas 219,468 218,413
Laredo, Texas 133,239 122,899
Reynosa, Tamaulipas 376,676 332,755
McAllen, Texas 383,545 84,021
Matamoros, Tamaulipas 303,392 266,055
Brownsville, Texas 260,120 98,962
Mexican Total 3,500,038 3,149,378
U.S. Total 5,722,694 2,070,886
TOTAL 9,222,732 5,220,264
Source: UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA SUMMARY,
ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MExIcAN-U.S. BORDER AREA, 7 (February
1992).
17. While much of this comment will focus on the urban border area, a brief
comment on the plight of the "colonias" is warranted. The term "colonias" re-
fers to the sparsely populated regions between the sister cities where a small
population exists. These areas lack much infrastructure, including proper sew-
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/9
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mental issues confronting the border area can be explained
best individually of one another.' 8
A. The Maquiladoras
The term "maquiladora" applies to what has rapidly be-
come over 2,000 industrial processing and assembly plants
employing over 400,000 persons south of the U.S.-Mexican
border. 19 Through Mexico's Maquiladora program, first es-
tablished in 1965, stringent Mexican trade barriers between
Mexico and the rest of the world were relaxed to permit the
importation into Mexico of component parts to the foreign
owned plants. At these plants, finished products are assem-
bled at low wages 20 and then exported back to the country of
origin. 2 ' The goods, with limited exception, may not be sold
in Mexico, and any hazardous waste created by the assembly
of these goods is to be sent back to the respective company's
country of origin.22
The goal of the Maquiladora program was to provide des-
perately needed jobs to Mexicans in the region. Companies
taking part in the program enjoy economic advantages of-
fered by cheaper labor and tax benefits. 23 Examples of indus-
tries currently taking advantage of the Maquiladora program
include automotive, textile, ceramic, chemical, electrical and
age and water treatment. The Border Plan does address this concern, and ear-
marks manpower and financial resources accordingly. Id. at V-14.
18. For a more complete discussion of the environmental problems con-
fronting the border region, see James P. Duffy III, The Environmental Implica-
tions of a North American Free Trade Agreement, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 561
(1993).
19. Justin Ward and Glenn T. Prickett, Prospects for a Green Trade Agree-
ment, 34 ENV'T 2 (1992).
20. "In 1991, the average hourly compensation for American manufacturing
workers was $15.45, while for Mexican manufacturing workers, it was $2.17.
In the maquiladoras, it was even less than that-just $1.25." Id.
21. Justin Ward and Glenn T. Prickett, Prospects for a Green Trade Agree-
ment, 34 ENV'T 1 (1992).
22. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at 11-9.
23. Patrick J. McDonnell, Foreign-Owned Companies Add to Mexico's Pollu-
tion, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1991, at Al, A14.
1993] 373
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furniture. 24 Notable American corporations participating in
the Maquiladora program include the "Big Three"
automakers (Ford, Chrysler and General Motors) and elec-
tronics producer Zenith.25
The Maquiladora program may well be the best argu-
ment of those who fear American jobs being lost as a result of
NAFTA. Cheap labor and lax environmental standards have
meant lost American jobs. For this reason NAFTA and the
Border Plan must address the environmental disparity be-
tween the two nations.
B. Water
Mexico and the United States have followed a water pol-
icy pursuant to a 1944 treaty on the Utilization of Waters of
the Colorado and the Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande
("the Water Treaty" of 1944).26 This treaty alone, unfortu-
nately, does not adequately address the current situation in
the border region. Rapid industrial, and in turn, residential
development have placed tremendous strain on water availa-
bility from the border rivers such as the Rio Grande and
Colorado. 27
The primary cause of water pollution and of the lack of
clean water in Mexico is due to insufficient sewer systems
and insufficient wastewater treatment facilities. 28 Only
about sixteen percent of Mexico's municipal and industrial
wastewater is treated before being released into water sup-
plies.29 Many of the poor residents of the border region are
24. TEXAS CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES, OVERVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL IS-
SUES ASSOCIATED WITH MAQUILADORA DEELOPMENT ALONG THE TEXAS-MEXmcAN
BORDER, 1 (1990).
25. WILLiAM MCGAUGHEY, JR., A U.S.-MExico-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREE-
MENT: Do WE JUST SAY No?, 59 (1992).
26. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at III-1; Treaty Between the United States
of America and Mexico Relating to the Utilization of the Waters of the Colorado
and the Tijuana Rivers, and of the Rio Grande from Fort Quitman, Texas to the
Gulf of Mexico, Nov. 14, 1944, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219 (1944).
27. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at 111-3.
28. Brenda S. Hustis, The Environmental Implications of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement, 28 TEx. INT'L L.J. 589, 597 (1993).
29. Id.
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forced to use the large border rivers for drinking, washing
and irrigation despite the heavy presence of sewage and con-
taminants. For example, the Rio Grande forms the boundary
between Texas and Mexico and is the primary source of water
for drinking, irrigation and recreation on both sides of the
border.30 Millions of gallons of raw sewage and industrial
contaminants are discharged into the river daily.31 Accord-
ing to a former EPA Regional Administrator, other border re-
gion problems, "pale by comparison," to the problems
associated with water pollution.32
Existing treatment facilities are also inadequate and are
unable to handle the heightened presence of sewage. In
many of the sister cities, particularly Tijuana/San Diego,
wastewater discharges and raw sewage overflow have been
unavoidable consequences of rapid regional development. 33
Furthermore, the Gulf of Mexico, one of the richest regions of
fish, wildlife and countless fauna, has also been endangered
by overpopulation and development. 34
C. Air
The sister cities along the border suffer severe conse-
quences from severe air pollution problems. The surrounding
noxious air, due to rapid development absent parallel envi-
ronmental policy, threatens the health and safety of all peo-
ple living there. Mobile (automobiles and trucks) and
stationary (manufacturing plants) sources account for the
problems, which may be exacerbated by the geographic set-
ting of the sister cities.35
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. "Water Pollution Biggest Problem for Border Region," Former Official
Says, IN 'L ENVTL. DAILY, (BNA) 1 (Oct. 4, 1993) (interview with Buck Wynne,
former Bush Administration EPA Regional Administrator).
33. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at 111-9.
34. Id. at 111-10, 11.
35. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
REVIEW OF U.S.-MEx. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 87 (1992). Many sister cities are
located in valleys. Valleys tend to retain large quantities of mobile and station-
ary pollution, resulting in "smog" conditions. Id. Specific types of stationary
sources of air pollution include the vast number of respiratory problem produc-
ing copper smelters along areas of the Arizona-Sonora border region. Brenda S.
NAFTA19931 375
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The largest obstacle to sounder air policy is the lack of
current data to determine the best means to proceed.3 6 While
each nation has its own federal laws regarding air quality,
compliance with these standards in the border region has not
occurred, and lack of available data pertaining to the border
region may have been a contributing factor.37 Additionally,
related environmental policies to control air pollution have
been limited. For example, only in 1991 did Mexico require
catalytic converters38 in its automobiles.3 9 Clearly, there is
enough evidence available to support the argument of a seri-
ous air pollution problem. For example, the air quality over
several sister cities exceeds United States ambient air qual-
ity standards. 40
Other policy shortcomings exacerbating mobile sources of
air pollution include a lack of adequate infrastructure. This
is most clearly demonstrated by the lack of paved roadways
to disperse traffic, as well as the lack of public transportation
(buses and trains) to help diminish the volume of that same
traffic.41 Such conditions add to current air pollution
problems. Additional stationary pollution problems result
from inadequate compliance by the manufacturing base to
current requirements.42
Hustis, The Environmental Implications of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 28 TEx. INT'L L.J. 589, 596 (1993).
36. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at 111-12.
37. Id.
38. A Catalytic Converter is defined as a reaction chamber into which ex-
haust gases from an automotive engine are passed together with excess air so
that carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon pollutants are oxidized to carbon diox-
ide and water. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 247 (2d ed. 1982). In lay
terms, a catalytic converter "purifies" environmentally hazardous car exhaust
into harmless properties.
39. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
REVIEW OF U.S.-MEx. ENVIRONMENTAL IssuEs 87 (1992).
40. J. Michael Kennedy, On Texas Border, Outlook for Air Quality is Murky,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1991, at Al, A20.
41. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at 111-14,
42. Id.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/9
NAFTA
D. Hazardous Waste
Proper management of hazardous waste is essential to
the preserving the quality of United States and Mexican
lands, and ensuring the safety of their respective citizens.
Management of hazardous waste requires treatment, re-
cycling and disposal.43 These issues have not been ade-
quately addressed in the past. For example, the EPA has
determined that there has been minimal compliance by Ma-
quiladora industries regarding proper disposal of hazardous
waste.44 Only a small percentage of the total amount of haz-
ardous waste required by Mexican law to have been exported
from the Maquiladora region has actually been accounted for.
It is likely that much of the waste generated by the region is
in unlawful dumping grounds. 45
For these reasons, as will be later expanded upon, the
Border Plan's primary emphasis in the area of hazardous
waste is on the transboundary movement of such waste. In
particular, Border Plan policies apply to either American Ma-
quiladora or Maquiladora companies who contract with
United States hazardous waste disposers to remove the haz-
ardous waste from Mexico. 46 The Border Plan also contains
an initiative to promote the use of non-toxic substitute
materials.47
In addition, as alluded to above, Mexican intrastate, and
transboundary tracking of hazardous waste, has been a seri-
ous problem. Statistics on current hazardous waste produc-
43. Id. at 111-18. Note that the lack of adequate air pollution data is not
limited to the Border Region. Greenpeace, an international organization de-
voted to environmental concerns, has reported that, "[wihile Mexico City's gov-
ernment gives daily reports on ozone levels, the city's monitoring and reporting
of suspended microscopic particles, which pose a greater long-term health
threat, is inadequate at best." Greenpeace Faults Reports on Particulates in
Mexico City, INT'L ENvTL. DAILY, (BNA) 1 (Oct. 10, 1993).
44. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S.-Mxcio TRADE: INFORMATION ON
ENVmoNmENTAL REGULATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT, 1 (1991).
45. Id.
46. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12. It is also interesting to note that Mexican
law prohibits the importation of hazardous waste for disposal within Mexico's
boundaries. Mexico General Law on Ecological Equilibrium and Environmen-
tal Protection, Article 153, III (1988).
47. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at 111-19.
1993]
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tion by the Maquiladoras are not fully known, and are
believed to be much higher than recorded values.48 There are
Mexican procedures presently in place to track trans-
boundary and Mexican intrastate waste, but they have had
only limited success.49 The United States' flow of hazardous
waste is governed by the Uniform Hazardous Waste Mani-
fest.50 It tracks hazardous waste from its generation, trans-
portation and final disposal, including quantities and
characteristics. 51
Unless a stronger joint United States-Mexican approach
to dealing with hazardous waste and its tracking is estab-
lished, illegal waste flow will increase, leading to various en-
vironmental and public health problems. These problems
include: exposure of toxic chemicals to the environment and
general population, contamination of surface and ground
water, and air pollution due to evaporation and/or
incineration. 52
E. Pesticides
The need for adequate joint regulation of pesticides is
enormous. From an environmental perspective, safe pesti-
cides for both the applier and consumer are essential. Ac-
cording to the Border Plan, the pesticides used on both sides
are generally equivalent. 53 The United States federal pesti-
cide law54 and the 1988 Mexican environmental statute55
both provide comprehensive regulation on the use of pesti-
48. Id. at 111-20. A recent GAO study cites the opinion of the United States
embassy in Mexico that approximately 13,000 tons of hazardous waste is cre-
ated in Mexico per day. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S.-MExIco TRADE:
INFORMATION ON ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT (1991).
49. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at 111-20. Such procedures include Mex-
ico's Ecological Guide, an import/export document that bases its information on
data found in corporate semi-annual reports. Reliance on a company's semi-
annual report is a dangerous mechanism to assure that all hazardous waste is
being accounted for. Id.
50. Id. at 111-21.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 111-20.
53. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at 111-25.
54. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C.
§ 136 (1988)[hereinafter FIFRA].
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/9
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cides. 56 However, the plans diverge in that some pesticides in
Mexico have different registered uses than in the United
States. This could have major repercussions if not addressed
because, as will be seen within the NAFTA text, one nation
will not accept another nation's goods treated with an unau-
thorized pesticide.5 7
55. The General Law on Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protec-
tion (Published in the Federal Diario Oficial on Jan. 28, 1988; effective Mar. 1,
1988) [hereinafter 1988 Mexican Environmental Law].
56. See Federal, Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), at 7
U.S.C. § 136v (a) ("a state may regulate the sale or use of any federally regis-
tered pesticide or device in the state, but only if and to the extent the regulation
does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter."); 1988 Mexico
Environmental Law, Chapter III, Art. 134(V) ("Use of pesticides, fertilizers
and toxic substances should be compatible with the equilibrium of the
ecosystems.")
In addition, the Mexican environmental law provides for the disposal, im-
portation and exportation of pesticides. Article 143 of the same chapter ad-
dresses the issue of standards and the disposal of pesticides, fertilizers and
toxic substances:
Pesticides, fertilizers and toxic substances shall remain subject to
the official Mexican standards and to the technical standards is-
sued jointly by the Ministry and the Ministries of Agriculture and
Hydraulic Resources, of Health and of Trade and Industrial Promo-
tion, so as to avoid causing ecological imbalances. The regulation to
this Law shall establish, in the same manner, the rules that must
be complied with by activities relating to said substances or prod-
ucts, including the final disposal of their wastes, empty packaging
and containers; measures for avoiding adverse effects on the ecosys-
tems, and the procedures for granting the pertinent authorizations.
Id. at Art. 143. Article 144 of the Mexican Environmental Law covers the im-
portation and exportation of pesticides, fertilizers and toxic substances:
In keeping with the provisions of this Law, the Law on Animal and
Plant Health of the United Mexican States, and any other applica-
ble legal and regulatory provisions, the Ministry, together with the
Ministries of Health, of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources, and
of Trade and Industrial Promotion, shall participate in reviewing
customs duties relative to importation or exportation of pesticides,
fertilizers and toxic substances. No authorizations shall be granted
for importation of pesticides, fertilizers and toxic substances when
their use is banned in the country in which they have been pre-
pared or manufactured. The Ministry shall promote, before the
component authorities, the establishment of special requirements
for manufacture in the country of said substances and products,
when their use may cause ecological imbalances.
Id. at Art. 144.
57. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at 111-25.
15
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F. Contingency Planning/Emergency Response
To adequately prepare for an environmental emergency
in the border area, the U.S. and Mexico have already, beyond
their individual commitments, 58 created a Joint Response
Team (JRT).59 JRT has held conferences, formed contingency
planning and simulation exercises, and held joint training ex-
ercises to prepare for an emergency.60 The Border Plan calls
for more detailed JRT initiatives and directives to prepare for
the increasingly mutual risks that NAFTA may produce. 61
To date, joint pollution prevention efforts have been illu-
sory at best. According to the Border Plan, activity in this
area has not gone beyond statement of the problem, with
amorphous proposals for solutions. 62
As shown, the environmental concerns of the border area
are significant. They demonstrate a need on the part of any
economic relationship between the United States and Mexico
to be cognizant of current environmental problems. Thus
they demonstrate the necessity that NAFTA provide mecha-
nisms to foster environmental protection without eliminating
the economic advancement that could pay for such environ-
mental improvements.
It has also been the responsibility of United States
NAFTA negotiators to both ensure the maintenance of
America's strict environmental standards, and protect Ameri-
can consumers from goods and agriculture falling below such
standards. As the following description of environmentally
relevant NAFTA provisions indicate, U.S. citizen interests
will be protected. Moreover, these provisions demand of Mex-
58. U.S. commitment required under CERCLA and SARA Amendments;
Mexico has adhered to polices created under the United Nations Environment
Program APELL (Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at the Local
Level). Id. at 111-26.
59. Id.
60. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at 111-26.
61. Id.
62. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at 111-28. Past illusory efforts have in-
cluded statements such as: "1) Products can be reformulated to use less hazard-
ous material; 2) Processes can be modified to use less input material; 3)
Equipment and processes can be redesigned to use less energy; 4) Waste mater-
ials can be recovered for recycling or reuse." Id.
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/9
NAFTA
ico no alternative but stricter environmental standards if
they are to benefit from NAFTA.
IV. NAFTA: Relevant Environmental Provisions
A. The Preamble and Chapter 1 - The Environmental
Groundwork Is Laid
NAFTA's commitment to the environment is first seen in
its preamble. There, the governments of Canada, Mexico and
the United States resolve to, "STRENGTHEN the develop-
ment and enforcement of environmental laws."6 3 NAFTA
next provides, under Article 104, that when there is any in-
consistency between NAFTA and trade obligations under
other environmental treaties,6 the latter shall take priority,
except that where there are similar means to comply with al-
ternate obligations, the "least inconsistent" with NAFTA
shall apply.65
B. Chapter 9 - Each Nation May Pass Environmental
Laws Independently
Among the most important environmental provisions
within this economic trade agreement is Article 904(2). It
provides, in relevant part, that each state, in order to pursue
its own objectives relating to the environment and protection
of human, plant and animal life, may establish levels of pro-
tection it deems appropriate.6 6 This provision may be viewed
in different ways.
First, it may be considered a triumph for all involved.
The United States' environmental policies will stand, and
thus guarantee the American public that America's strict
standards of environmental control will not be compromised.
63. NAFTA, supra note 1, at preamble (emphasis in original).
64. The applicable treaties are the Convention on the International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, done at Washington, March 3,
1973; the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, done
at Montreal, September 16, 1987, as amended June 29, 1990; the Basel Conven-
tion on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal, opened for signature Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989).
65. NAFTA, supra note 1, at 1-2.
66. Id. at 9-2.
1993]
17
382 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11
Numerous environmental groups have applauded this provi-
sion as a substantive step towards protecting America's envi-
ronment.67 Even in the absence of trade barriers, Mexican
goods not meeting U.S. standards will not be permitted entry,
and visa versa. The incentive for either country to improve
standards is obvious: raise your standards, or gain nothing
from NAFTA.
An alternate view of the provision is not one of optimism.
Critics fear that, by not forcing Mexico, through NAFTA, to
improve their own environmental standards, Mexico will
make their goods, and grow their agricultural stuffs in a
manner that will minimally meet American or Canadian
standards, while sacrificing a "greener" methodology in agri-
culture and manufacturing. 68 Further, critics fear that per-
mitting each nation to set its own standards may result in a
mass migration of American business due to Mexico's less rig-
orous and cheaper standards, resulting in heavy job loss in
the U.S.69
Article 906(1) of NAFTA recognizes the importance of
standards-related measures among the three member states,
and calls on them to work together to further the protection
of the environment and related concerns. 70 This will occur
pursuant to Article 913, which establishes a Committee on
Standards-Related Measure, comprising representatives of
each nation.71 Within the Committee, ANNEX 913-C pro-
67. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, SYNOPSIS OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE FED-
ERATION TESTIMONY REGARDING EmnRONmENTAL CONCERNS RELATED TO THE
NAFTA BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON FINANCE, 102d CONG., 2nd SESS. 1 (Sept. 16, 1992) (Statement of
Stewart J. Hudson, National Wildlife Federation);, Statement of Kathryn S.
Fuller, supra note 4, at 4.
68. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
69. Hearings on the North American Free Trade Agreement Before the Sen-
ate Finance Comm., 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1992) (Statement of Thomas R.
Donahue, Secretary-Treasurer, American Federation of Labor And Congress of
Industrial Organizations).
70. NAFTA, supra note 1, at 9-3; Related concerns include human, animal
and plant life.
71. Id. at 9-11.
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vides for subcommittees to deal with standardizing specific
areas, such as automobile emissions. 72
C. Chapter 7 - Sanitary Measures and Scientific
Principles
Chapter 7, subchapter (b) of NAFTA deals solely with the
issue of sanitary and phytosanitary73 measures. The scope of
the provisions cover any measure affecting trade between the
states.74 Like article 906(1), article 754(1) permits each coun-
try to make its own sanitary or phytosanitary standards for
protection of human, animal or plant life.75
Another controversial provision arises at this point. Ar-
ticle 754(3) states that whatever standards each country
makes are acceptable so long as they are based on "scientific
principles." 76 Many have questioned what that exactly
means. Whose principles? Who determines their validity?
This is seen as a potentially dangerous loophole absent fur-
ther clarification.77 Safeguarding against such potential un-
trustworthy "scientific principles" is attempted through
Article 755, which calls for relevant international standards
to serve as the scientific base from which each state may cre-
ate stricter provisions.78
Article 758 utilizes the "scientific principles" approach in
a different manner. It provides that each member state may
adapt specific sanitary and phytosanitary standards to spe-
cific regions of their state as needed. 79 NAFTA imposes an
additional obstacle on those seeking to export goods to re-
72. Id. at 9-18.
73. Phytosanitary is the branch of ecology that deals with the characteris-
tics, relationships and distribution of associated plants. AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 936 (2d ed. 1982).
74. NAFTA, supra note 1 at 7-35.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 7-36.
77. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS
FOR THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 5 (June 1992).
78. NAFTA, supra note 1, at 7-36; Article 754(4) checks this power only to
the extent that resulting policies may not discriminate. Article 754(5) allows
states to adopt policies "only to the extent necessary to achieve its appropriate
level of protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility." Id.
79. Id. at 7-39.
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gions where specific standards have been adapted. Such ex-
porters have the burden of proving to the importer, by means
of "scientific principles," the safety of his goods pursuant to
importer state standards.80
Article 760 promotes awareness of environmental con-
trols by requiring notice whenever a new standard is created,
or an old one is modified or struck.81 Article 762 promotes
technical advice, assistance and overall cooperation among
the three parties.82
D. Chapter 11 - No Investment at the Expense of the
Environment
Chapter 11 deals with investment, services and related
matters.8 3 Its scope pertains to investors of one nation, with
investments in another nation.8 4 Article 1114 is a particu-
larly sensitive environmental provision that states, in rele-
vant part, "nothing in Chapter 11 shall be construed to
prevent a Party [nation] from adopting, maintaining, or en-
forcing any measure, to ensure that investment activity in its
territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmen-
tal concerns."85 This is an environmental provision restrict-
ing economic development, in an economic treaty.
Subsection two of Article 1114 furthers the commitment
to joint economic and environmentally-sound policy by stat-
ing that a nation should not relax environmental standards
to encourage investment.86
E. Chapter 20 - Dispute Settlement Based on
International Environmental Treaties
Chapter 20 deals with institutional arrangements and
dispute settlement procedures. One of the strongest criti-
cisms of environmental policies in general is their inability to
80. Id. at 7-40.
81. Id. at 7-43.
82. Id. at 7-45.
83. NAFTA, supra note 1, at 11-1.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 11-10 (emphasis added).
86. Id.
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be adequately enforced.8 7 In Article 2005(3) and (4), NAFTA
provides varying mechanisms for environmental disputes to
be addressed. These provisions permit settlement pursuant
to either NAFTA provisions or applicable international trea-
ties.88 Furthermore, disputes regarding specific environmen-
tal, health or safety requirements are to be addressed under a
NAFTA-provided scientific review board.8 9
F. Chapter 21 - NAFTA Exception to the Environment's
Benefit
Chapter 21 deals with exceptions to the entire NAFTA
text. Significant here is Article 2101(3), which provides that
nothing in Article 1106 (investment performance require-
ments) shall be interpreted to preclude a state from passing
or retaining environmental measures needed to protect
human, animal or plant life.90
Given the economic nature of this treaty, there are abun-
dant environmental provisions. The environmental provi-
sions have been implemented in a complementary fashion
unlike any prior treaty. As Stewart J. Hudson of the Na-
tional Wildlife Foundation stated, "The NAFTA is, most as-
suredly, the 'greenest' trade agreement that has yet been
negotiated, and it represents a positive step towards unifying
economic and environmental concerns in the pursuit of sus-
tainable development throughout North America."91
87. Enforcement capacity is an integral part of the Border Plan, as will be
seen below. See infra Section V.
88. NAFTA, supra note 1, at 20-4; See supra note 65. Some of these treaties
would include: the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species,
the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazard-
ous Wastes and their Disposal, The La Paz Agreements for Environmental Pro-
tection, the Montreal Protocol, and the Agreement between Canada and the
United States Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste.
89. Id. at 20-11, Article 2015.
90. Id. at 21-2. Note the similarity to Article 1113 as it limits economic
growth to protect the environment.
91. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, SYNOPSIS OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE FED-
ERATION, TESTIMONY REGARDING ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS RELATED TO THE
NAFTA BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON FINANCE 102d CONG., 2d SEss. 10 (Sept. 16, 1992).
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In this spirit, the governments of Mexico and the United
States have created a working relationship between their re-
spective environmental agencies, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency of the United States (EPA), and the Mexican
Social Development Secretariat (SEDESOL).92 Together,
these agencies have created an environmental agreement
(the Border Plan) independent of NAFTA to address the pres-
ent environmental issues confronting the border area. Addi-
tionally, this agreement seeks to prepare the border region so
that economic growth resulting from NAFTA may coexist
with an increasingly stable and healthy environment.
V. The Border Plan and its Initiatives
A. Introduction
On November 27, 1990, Presidents Carlos Salinas de
Gortari of Mexico and George Bush of the United States met.
The result, among others, was a commitment to solving the
current environmental problems of the border area,93 and to
prepare an agreement between the two states that would ad-
dress the potential environmental impacts that a free trade
agreement would cause.94 The Border Plan, in turn, will be
revised and expanded in stages as new data is collected, prior
implementation measures are completed, and new ones are
formulated. 95 This is a "living" document that Mexico and
the United States have committed to in the hope of fostering
economic growth in conjunction with sustaining the
environment.96
The Border Plan was purposefully designed to supple-
ment NAFTA. The Border Plan notes that both states in-
tended for "two tracks" to be taken to avoid negative
92. SEDESOL was created in May of 1992, replacing the Mexican Ministry
for Urban Development and Ecology (SEDUE).
93. The border area stretches for 2,000 miles, from San Diego, California, to
the Gulf of Mexico, and has a 100 kilometer depth on each side of the interna-
tional boundary. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at 11-1,2.
94. Id. at 1-2.
95. Id. at 1-4.
96. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at 1-4.
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environmental impacts of NAFTA. 97 The first track consists
of the above environmental provisions within NAFTA itself.98
The second track is comprised of agreements similar to and
including the Border Plan, that are designed to foster eco-
nomic development in an environmentally friendly manner.99
B. Priorities of the Border Plan
The drafters of the Border Plan asserted two aspirations
when they embarked on this agreement: the critical need for
action and long term objectives of the Border Plan to prepare
for present and future environmental and economic growth
under NAFTA. In preparation for the implementation of Bor-
der Plan initiatives, the drafters, from EPA and SEDUE,
knew that though committed, each state was, is, and will be
limited in the amount of financial resources available to ad-
dress the issues. Prioritizing their initiatives was done under
a risk-based approach to address the most critical needs
first.100 The order devised for implementation of Border Plan
initiatives is as follows:
1. Media specific issues including municipal wastewater,
water supply sources, and air (e.g., ozone and particulate
matter);
2. Source control issues including industrial wastewater,
hazardous waste, air toxins, and accidental releases;
3. Hazardous and municipal waste issues including im-
port/export of hazardous waste, abandoned or illegal haz-
ardous waste sites, and municipal waste sites, municipal
solid waste sites along with the collection and transporta-
tion of municipal solid waste; and
4. Emergency response/contingency planning including
the development and coordination of all affected agencies
to prepare, train, and respond to potential/actual acciden-
tal releases. 1 1
97. Id. at 1-5.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at IV-1.
101. Id. at IV-3.
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These priorities will start with the sister cities, as op-
posed to the colonias, 10 2 as the need is more pressing there.103
As a final general priority, the Maquiladora situation will be
reevaluated in light of all implementation initiatives. 0 4
C. Implementation of the Border Plan (First Stage 1992-
1994)
After addressing all relevant issues and the priorities
with which they will be considered, this comment now focuses
on the actual implementation provisions provided by the Bor-
der Plan.
In order to implement Border Plan initiatives, Mexico
has committed $460 million over a three-year period.10 5 The
United States, for Fiscal Year 1992 had committed $143 mil-
lion.'06 Since then, future Congressional appropriations for
border area activity have steadily increased. 0 7
1. Enforcement
In order to assure that implemented initiatives are ad-
hered to, and to promote the welfare of America's citizens and
its environment, strong border enforcement, particularly in
the area of hazardous waste is essential. To this end,
SEDESOL will spend $6.3 million U.S. dollars to monitor the
border crossings of raw materials and hazardous wastes, and
conduct thorough inspections of the maquiladoras.' 0 8 This is
a 450% increase in Mexican border enforcement spending. 0 9
Already, SEDESOL has been successful in improving en-
forcement. Between 1982 and 1984, there were only 1,209 in-
spections of Mexican industry. 10 Between 1988 and 1990,
102. See supra note 17.
103. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, IV-4.
104. Id. at IV-5.
105. Id. at V-1.
106. Id.
107. Id. at V-52.
108. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at V-4.
109. Id. at V-50. Note that recent commitments of the United States, Mexico
and the World Bank may result in a substantial increase of that amount.
110. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
REVIEW OF U.S.-MEx. ENVIRONMENTAL IssuEs 41 (1992).
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after Mexico implemented its 1988 environmental law, 5,404
inspections took place."' Moreover, between 1982 and 1984,
information was not even available to determine how many
(or few) enforcement actions there were. Between 1988 and
1990, there were three permanent closings (including a state
owned oil refinery), 980 partial or temporary closings, 29 relo-
cations, 1,032 agreements for compliance scheduling, and 679
voluntary compliance agreements. 112 Finally, the Border
Plan has resulted in an increase in Mexico's inspection team
from 19 in 1991,113 to more than 300 today, 200 of which are
specifically targeted for the border region. 114
The Border Plan enforcement strategy also calls for
targeting violations to priority targets, such as recidivist non-
compliers of environmental laws on both sides of the border,
and sensitive geographic regions of mutual concern. 115 Fur-
ther, enforcement will be made as media-friendly as possible,
so that the public will be aware of manufacturers that are not
complying. 116 Lastly, the Border Plan creates the Coopera-
tive Enforcement Strategy Work Group to, among other
things: exchange information regarding priority enforcement
issues relevant to both states; develop compatible hazardous-
waste tracking systems (including a shared computer system
in 1992117) to ease the exchange of data on moving waste; ex-
change relevant statistical information; and hold joint-train-
ing exercises."l i
2. Industrial Multimedia Source Controls
a. Water
The Border Plan provided for initiation of a program to
monitor groundwater sources and trouble-spots, and for
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:
IssuEs FOR CONGRESS 48 (Mar. 25, 1991).
114. STATEMENT OF WILLIAM K. REILY, supra note 107, at 9.
115. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at V-4.
116. Id. at V-5.
117. Id. at V-10.
118. Id. at V-6.
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SEDESOL, EPA, and the International Boundary Water
Commission to develop an inventory of source, quality and
treatment processes for existing water facilities in the sister
cities during 1992.119 This program will also assess future
infrastructure needs for collection, treatment and disposal of
water.120 This will prepare later stages of the Border Plan to
act aggressively in order to deal with further growth associ-
ated with NAFTA.
The First Stage of the Border Plan calls for the comple-
tion of an international water treatment works for Tijuana/
San Diego that will include: completion of an international
treatment plant by 1995; construction of the land portion of
the ocean outfall component in 1993 (the ocean portion to im-
mediately follow); and construction of a 25 million gallon-per-
day secondary treatment plant in San Diego County near the
international boundary. 121
For Ciudad Juarez/El Paso, the First Stage calls for, by
the end of 1994: construction of the Riverside Collector and
extension; expansion of the sewage system; construction of a
pumping plant to convey sewage from Riverside to a treat-
ment plant; and the construction of a secondary treatment
plant with a 31 million gallon-per-day capacity located down-
stream from the Ciudad Juarez/Lincoln International
Bridge. 122
In addition to the above examples for actual construc-
tion, the Border Plan outlines numerous proposals for studies
to be conducted that will enable future development as
needed.123
b. Air
As noted earlier, due to the lack of current data regard-
ing air quality, it is necessary that much of the implementing
procedures regarding air be in the form of studies, task forces
119. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at V-12.
120. Id.
121. Id. at V-15.
122. Id. at V-20.
123. Id. at V. Note that actual construction called for by the Border Plan is
not limited to the examples mentioned above.
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and work groups to provide a data base for future programs.
Examples of these programs include the identification and
implementation of approaches to review vehicular emissions
at border crossings (1992); the development, promotion and
implementation of a phased-approach vehicle inspection and
maintenance program (1992); and improvement of public
transportation (1994).124
c. Hazardous Waste and Materials
The Border Plan initiatives designed to deal with haz-
ardous waste and materials focus upon the goals of waste
tracking, surveillance/enforcement, education and improved
and safer transport methods. 125 These types of initiatives in-
clude: a joint U.S.-Mexican data base to monitor trans-
boundary waste movement; increased joint training;
exchange of all relevant information; inspections by
SEDESOL and EPA to establish the amount and form of haz-
ardous waste produced by both sides; joint efforts to locate
illegal dump sites; and the development of a cooperative haz-
ardous waste transportation enforcement strategy.126
d. Pesticides
Joint effort is the key to the Border Plan's stage one ini-
tiatives regarding pesticides. The Border Plan calls for a
joint record-keeping system to be instituted by border states
on both sides to identify the types and quantities of pesticides
in use. 127 This will be useful in monitoring programs that
keep track of appropriate pesticides. 128 Further, SEDESOL
and EPA will develop a joint program combatting pesticide
misuse, and provide farmer applicator training.129
124. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at V-27.
125. Id. at V-29.
126. Id. at V-30-33.
127. Id. at V-35.
128. Note that the economic significance of this initiative will provide a sec-
ondary safeguard against a grower using a pesticide unacceptable to a member
nation.
129. BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at V-35.
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e. Contingency Planning/Emergency Response
Stage One of the Border Plan calls for improvement and
testing of current emergency plans in Tijuana/San Diego,
Mexicali/Imperial County, and Matamoros/Brownsville. 130
Moreover, contingency plans will be developed, reviewed and
tested for all remaining sister cities by the end of 1994.131
Upon completion, these plans will provide for data sharing
with regard to many hazardous wastes. This will promote
knowledge on both sides of the border, thereby aiding a quick
response and success to any emergency. 132
VI. The Environmental Side Agreement
In response to mounting political pressure from numer-
ous environmental groups and the national press, the Clinton
Administration took an additional step towards appeasing
environmental critics of NAFTA by signing the NAFTA Sup-
plemental Agreements on Trade and the Environment on
September 15, 1993.
The North American Agreement on Environmental Coop-
eration 133 is designed to complement the already existing,
comprehensive provisions within NAFTA.134 In many ways,
the agreement reinforces provisions already implemented in
NAFTA. For example, Article three of the Side Agreement
recognizes the right of each nation to establish its own levels
of environmental protection. 135 NAFTA includes this in Arti-
cle 904(2).136 Also, Article 40 of the Side Agreement main-
tains that nothing in the Side Agreement will affect the
existing rights of the nations under presently existing inter-
130. Id. at V-37.
131. Id.
132. Id. at V-38-39.
133. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, September
15, 1993, U.S.-Mex.-Can. [hereinafter Side Agreement].
134. Side Agreement, supra note 133, at 2.
135. Id. at 3.
136. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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national environmental agreements.137 NAFTA states this in
Article 104.138
The Side Agreement creates a Commission For Environ-
mental Cooperation, comprised of a Council and a Secreta-
riat.139  The Council will be made of cabinet level
representatives from the three NAFTA members. 140 Article
10 provides that the Council will oversee the Secretariat (de-
scribed below) and make various recommendations regarding
NAFTA environmental issues. 141 Such issues will range from
transboundary waste management to assessing the environ-
mental impact of proposed projects of member states. 142 As
will also be described below, the Council also contends with
enforcement and dispute resolution issues.143
The Secretariat will be headed by an Executive Director
chosen by the parties. 144 This Executive Director will oversee
the Secretariat staff, whose actions and instructions will be
independent of the three member states. 145 The primary
function of the Secretariat will be to provide technical, ad-
ministrative and operational support to the Council. 146
The Side Agreement was intended by the Clinton admin-
istration to respond to the NAFTA critics' charges that it
lacked adequate enforcement mechanisms. To that end, rele-
vant provisions of the agreement include Articles 5 through 7
and Article 37.147 Article 5 calls for each country to "effec-
tively enforce" their environmental laws through "appropri-
ate government[al] action."148 The provision calls for
appointing inspectors, monitoring compliance with respective
laws, publication of corporate non-compliers (the "black list"),
137. Side Agreement, supra note 133, at 30.
138. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
139. Side Agreement, supra note 133, at 7.
140. Id.
141. Side Agreement, supra note 133, at 9.
142. Id.
143. Side Agreement, supra note 133, at 4.
144. Id. at 12.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Side Agreement, supra note 133, at 4-6, 29.
148. Id. at 4.
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and providing for mediation and arbitration services. 149 Arti-
cles 5 and 6 ensure that the judicial remedies available in
each state will be strictly applied to environmental
criminals. 150 Article 7 provides for procedural guarantees of
due process and public judicial proceedings, as well as a
statement prohibiting unconscionable court awarded dam-
ages. 151 Article 37 places parameters on the Commission's
inter-sovereign power. It provides that nothing in the Side
Agreement should be interpreted to "empower a Party's au-
thorities to undertake environmental law enforcement activi-
ties in the territory of another Party."152
The Secretariat and the Council of the Commission have
mechanisms independent of the member state's respective ju-
diciaries to deal with alleged violations of the agreement by
the governments of each member. Article 23 of the Side
Agreement permits Parties to seek assistance and guidance
from the Council if they have been unable to come to an un-
derstanding regarding the disptite. 153 Once at this level, the
Council will attempt to resolve the dispute. To do so, it may
seek the advice of relevant advisers and experts and make
recommendations to the Parties. 54 Recommendations will
be made public only at the discretion of the Council, which
must pass such a measure by a two-thirds vote.' 55 After 60
days, if the dispute has not been resolved, the Council may
convene an arbitral panel at the written request of the com-
plaining nation. 5 6 Within 180 days after arguments by all
sides are made, the panel will provide an initial report that
includes findings of fact, findings whether the alleged offend-
ing nation has failed to enforce its environmental law, and in
the case of such a finding, a recommendations for the resolu-
149. Id.
150. Id. at 5-6.
151. Side Agreement, supra note 133, at 6-7.
152. Id. at 29.
153. Id. at 20.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Side Agreement, supra note 133, at 21. Note that article 24(2) also per-
mits a third Party (nation) to join as a complainant.
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tion of the dispute. 157 Written comments may be made
within 30 days by Parties disputing the finding, and within
60 days after that, the final report shall be issued.158
Article 34 enables the arbitral panel to be reconvened
should it become clear that none of the recommendations
have been achieved, or if no settlement of any kind has come
to pass. 159 The reconvened panel would then have the power
to establish a plan to solve the dispute, or impose a "mone-
tary enforcement assessment" or fine, pursuant to Annex
34.160 Currently, the fine cannot exceed $20 million U.S. dol-
lars. 16 1 Beyond that, any further fines cannot exceed .007%
of total trade in goods. 162 Part 3 of the Annex provides that
all fines collected will be placed in a Commission controlled
fund to improve or enhance the environment or environmen-
tal law of the offending nation. 163
Moreover, should the Party not pay the fine assessed it,
the complaining party, pursuant to Article 36 and Annex
36B, may impose a tariff against the fined Party not to exceed
the rate applicable to the affected goods on the day prior to
NAFTA coming to force and the present Most-Favored-Na-
tion-rate on the date the Party suspends such benefits. 164
The tariff will last only until the equivalent amount of the
assessed fine is paid. 165
The above discussion explains the various options the
'member-nations have in dispute resolution. For individuals
157. Id. at 25.
158. Id. at 25.
159. Id. at 26.
160. Id. at 27.
161. Side Agreement, supra note 133, at 35.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 38.
165. Note that Annex 36A provides for a separate mechanism in the collec-
tion and enforcement of fines for Canada. In brief, the Canadians are entitled
to submit the panel determination to a court of competent jurisdiction. A panel
determination against Canada cannot be enforced until it has been first filed.
At this point, the Commission may seek enforcement of a panel determination
that, by being filed, now becomes an order of the court. Further, Annex 41(6)
permits Canada to, within a specified period, state whether the fine is to go
against the federal government of Canada or a specific province.
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and non-governmental organizations, Article 14 of the agree-
ment permits them to give "submissions" to the Secretariat
asserting that a Party (nation) is failing to "effectively enforce
its environmental law."166 The Secretariat will then deter-
mine if the "submission" merits making a request for a re-
sponse from a Party.167 If the Secretariat decides to make a
response request to a Party, the Party must advise the Secre-
tariat on the matter. Advising may consist of addressing the
matter directly, referring the submitter to relevant judicial
proceedings, or advising that private remedies are available
to the submitter.168 The final step in this process is the dis-
cretionary choice of the Secretariat to create a factual record
consisting of the submission and of the offending Party's
response. 169
Other measures of the Side Agreement include Article
16, which establishes the Joint Public Advisory Committee
(Committee). 170 The Committee shall have 15 members and
will convene at least once a year during the regular sessions
of the Council. The Committee's role will be to advise the
Council on NAFTA related matters. 171 In addition, the Com-
mittee may provide technical, scientific or other information
to the Secretariat. i7 2 Beyond the Committee, Articles 17 and
18 enable each Party to convene both a National Advisory
Committee and a Governmental Committee. Each of these
organizations will be comprised of citizens from each respec-
tive nation, and will serve to advise on, "implementation and
further elaboration of this Agreement."173
Further, Article 30 permits, on request of disputing Par-
ties who have been assigned an arbitral panel, that the panel
may hear from any expert person or organization on relevant
matters. 174 Also, funding of the Commission is covered by Ar-
166. Side Agreement, supra note 133, at 15.
167. Id. at 15.
168. Id. at 16.
169. Id. at 16.
170. Id. at 17.
171. Side Agreement, supra note 133, at 17.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 18.
174. Id. at 24.
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ticle 43, and provides for an equal contribution to be made by
all members. This is subject to appropriated funds consistent
with an individual Party's legal procedures. 175 Finally, to en-
able the Executive Director and the staff of the Secretariat to
exercise their functions, they are all granted the privileges
and immunities of each state as are needed to perform their
duties. 176
VII. Analysis
A. NAFTA
The North American Free Trade Agreement provides rec-
ognition of environmental concerns. NAFTA's recognition of
environmental concerns has led to several articles among its
provisions that are sensitive to environmental issues. It pro-
tects the United State's right to enforce existing U.S environ-
mental standards, permits each state to enforce tougher
standards than the international-environmental treaty based
standards that NAFTA recognizes, and permits stringent en-
vironmental requirements on new investment, as long as
they are not discriminatory. 77 Further, the NAFTA provi-
sions require that adequate notice be given to all parties
whenever a new environmental standard is created, or when
an old standard is modified or struck. 78 The NAFTA provi-
sions entitle each member nation to pass whatever measures
are necessary to ensure that future investment is undertaken
in an environmentally sensitive manner. 79 Finally, NAFTA
contains enforcement and dispute resolution provisions to
deal with environmental conflicts relevant to the treaty.
If one did not know the above was a synopsis of environ-
mental provisions within the North American Free Trade
Agreement, it would not be unreasonable to believe they were
part of a wholly environmental treaty. The Bush administra-
175. Id. at 31.
176. Side Agreement, supra note 133, at 31.
177. Hearing on the North American Free Trade Agreement Before the Senate
Finance Committee, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (Sept. 8, 1992) (statement of Carla
A. Hills, United States Trade Representative).
178. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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tion made an important step forward by incorporating such
provisions in an economic setting. Moreover, that adminis-
tration purposefully supplemented their efforts by directing
the EPA to construct a Border Plan to improve current envi-
ronmental provisions, and prepare for future growth associ-
ated with NAFTA.
Article 1114 of NAFTA deserves specific mention. This
provision within an economic treaty essentially instructs
states that investment may, and by implication, should come
second to environmental concern. 180 An illustration of Mex-
ico's commitment to protect the environment at the expense
of investment and short-term economic development is best
expressed by a recent act of President Salinas. In the last
year, Salinas closed down two of Mexico's largest state owned
oil refineries (one outside Mexico City) because of the refin-
eries' contributions to air pollution.' 8 ' Not only will NAFTA
not result in ignoring environmental issues; if anything, it
has forced Mexico to address such issues. 182
Another example of a NAFTA provision that, arguably,
inhibits trade in order that the environment be protected is
article 758.183 By requiring an exporter to prove the safety of
goods by means of "scientific principles" pursuant to importer
state standards, NAFTA places the burden on the exporter.
Not only must the exporter, as always, prove to a customs
department the safety of the goods, but now also directly to
the importer as well.
As a whole, NAFTA takes a solid step towards successful
integration of economic growth and environmental stabil-
ity.184 To those, who because of environmental concerns,
180. Id.
181. Hearing on the North American Free Trade Agreement Before the Senate
Finance Committee, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (Sept. 30, 1992) (testimony of Bill
Greehey, Chairman and CEO of Valero Energy Corp.).
182. See Mexico's 1988 Environmental Law and its $460 million commit-
ment to the Border Plan, its 200 new border inspectors, and its heightened
pressure on the Maquiladoras to report hazardous waste. Border Plan, supra
note 12, at V-1.
183. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
184. As stated by the National Audubon Society, "We believe that the
achievements of the NAFTA and the Side Agreements are only a beginning and
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would prefer no NAFTA, perhaps they should look at the situ-
ation from a broader perspective.
Were it not for the anticipation of NAFTA, the more
stringent Mexican environmental practices currently in place
would likely not be there. The reason for NAFTA's environ-
mental sensitivity is most likely not altruistic, but economic.
A successful trade agreement will not promote further eco-
nomic growth without adequate public infrastructure to back
it up. If infrastructure remained stagnant, at some point
NAFTA, and Mexico's benefit from it, would be held back by
inadequate resources. Therefore, both governments stand to
gain from increasing public works, that at the same time will
sustain and improve the environment.
While criticisms of NAFTA are stated below, a recogni-
tion of the aforementioned environmental consequences of
NAFTA cannot be forgotten. Absent the anticipation of
NAFTA, it is quite likely that the effort to promote environ-
mental stability in the border area through the Border Plan
would not be nearly as strong as it is now.
A controversial provision in NAFTA is Article 754(3),
which states that whatever environmental standards each
country makes are acceptable so long as they are based on
"scientific principles." i8 5 This provision may leave open a
loophole for environmental regulations subject to approval on
scientific principles determined at the discretion of the state
involved.
The other side of this issue is that scientific principles
may be challenged based on the international treaties
NAFTA gives priority. 186 Moreover, any goods not meeting
the United States import standards will still be refused.187 It
is therefore in the economic interest of each state to not pass
environmental provisions which have no practical effect. As
a final note, the commitment made by Mexico to enhance
that the business of negotiating trade agreements will never be the same." Let-
ter from Kathleen Rogers, National Audubon Society (Oct. 20, 1993).
185. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
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their laws as shown by the 1988 statute and the Border Plan
diffuses such fears tremendously. 188
188. SEDUE Environmental Protection Workload 1989 - 1991
SEDUE DEPARTMENTS 1989 1990 1991
Norms & Regulations Branch
Environmental impact 180 528 829
appraisals reviewed
Risk studies reviewed 86 102 89
Technical Norms issued 7 3 20
Pollution Control Branch
Air operating licenses issued 298 215 554
Water permits issued 638 952 1,321
Inspections 1,380 2,056 3,119
Facility Closures 160 357 1,228
Complete permanent 0 0 2
Complete temporary 1 2 325
Partial temporary 159 355 901
Compliance Agreements 225 500 1,323
Source: UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GENERAL GOVERNMENT
DWISION, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND
TRANSPORTATION, U.S. SENATE, U.S.-MExIco TRADE, ASSESSMENT OF MEXICO'S
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS FOR NEW COMPANIES, 18-21 (August 1992).
SEDUE Environmental Protection Funding and Staff
SEDUE FUNDING SEDUE
(U.S. dollars in STAFF (total
SEDUE DEPARTMENT thousands) staffing)
1989 1992 1989 1992
Norms and Regulations Branch* 256.6 4,546.5 73 280
Pollution Control Branch* 2,933.6 20,482.1 354 600
Border Plan Activities** - 30,565.4
* 1989 figures are actual expenditures. 1992 figures are budget data and
include World Bank loan and Global Environmental Trust grant funds.
Natural resources conservation expenditures/budget data are not included in
the above figures.
** Funds committed by Mexico for Border Plan Expenditures. Source: Id.
See also OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, EVALUATION OF MEXICO's ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS, REGULATIONS
AND STANDARDS (Preliminary Version of Final Report, 1993). This report con-
cludes that:
[W]ith certain important exceptions, the Mexican laws and many of
the regulations and standards promulgated thereunder in the prin-
cipal media areas of air, water, waste, and pesticides are broadly
compatible to their counterparts in the United States. The Mexican
and U.S. environmental protection regimes as a whole are designed
to achieve, when implemented and enforced, comparable levels of
environmental protection.
Id. at 101.
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Some have criticized NAFTA for not including more en-
forcement provisions.18 9 The argument is that if NAFTA ad-
dresses environmental issues, it should enforce them as
well.190 Such international enforcement of matters that, with
the exception of cross-border movement, are wholly within
one state, could pose sovereignty problems. Further, such en-
forcement mechanisms conflict with NAFTA provisions that
permit each party to maintain its own laws on the environ-
ment (including enforcement). Moreover, it is important to
note that both NAFTA itself, as well as the Environmental
Side Agreement include dispute resolution provisions. 191 The
policing of the environment should be left to the individual
states.
B. The Border Plan
The Border Plan provides an organized, prioritized, long
term program to improve the current infrastructure
shortfalls affecting the environment along the U.S.-Mexican
border. It also includes substantive mechanisms to deal with
consequences NAFTA may hold for the border region. With
limited resources on both sides and marginal support for in-
frastructure improvement by the U.S. Congress, the Border
Plan strives as best it can to meet the needs of the area.
The Border Plan (Stage One 1992-1994) calls for immedi-
ate substantive improvement of existing water treatment fa-
cilities, as well as the construction of new facilities to meet
current and future needs. 192 The Plan has resulted in a 450%
increase in Mexican border inspectors to bolster enforcement
efforts. 193 It has also established a targeting program to ini-
tiate heightened enforcement against priority targets. 94 In
189. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCE-
MENT: UNFINISHED BUSINESS IN NORTH AMERICAN TRADE, TESTIMONY OF THE
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE COMM. ON FINANCE, 102d CONG., 2d SEss. 3 (1992) (statement of
Justin Ward).
190. Id.
191. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 115-18 and accompanying text.
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the wake of limited current data regarding air quality in the
region, Stage One calls for measures to initiate studies, and
immediately implement any necessary responses.195 Hazard-
ous waste movement and pesticide control are two areas
where the Border Plan initiates joint efforts to more effec-
tively handle these issues. 196 Finally, Stage One also man-
dates contingency planning/emergency response procedures
to be in place in all sister cities by the end of 1994.197
Some criticize the Border Plan for having too many stud-
ies and work groups and too few substantive programs.19
First, if it was so easy to make the environment stable and
maintain continued growth in the border region, it would
have already been achieved. The fact is, however, that lim-
ited resources have resulted in a lack of specific data indicat-
ing which measured responses are most needed. The water,
hazardous waste and enforcement provisions of the Border
Plan implementation program are substantive at this first
stage.199 Perhaps more support from Congress in the way of
appropriating what former President Bush had asked for
would quicken implementation measures in the border
area.200 Second, the Border Plan was designed to be a multi-
stage process. Studies conducted in Stage One would logi-
cally be used to implement programs in later stages, based on
available funds and priorities.
The success of the Border Plan will be measured by its
actual achievement. Already, in the area of enforcement,
Mexico has made proven strides in this area. 20 ' Further-
more, an understanding that the Border Plan is a long-term
195. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
198. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, COMMENTS OF THE NATURAL
RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL ON THE INTEGRATED ENviRoNMENTAL PLAN FOR
THE MEx.-U.S. BORDER AREA (FiRsT STAGE, 1992-1994) 4 (Sept. 30, 1991) (state-
ment by Justin Ward, Natural Resources Defense Council) [hereinafter STATE-
MENT BY JUSTIN WARD].
199. See supra notes 108-23, 125-26 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text; note 188.
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program with limited funds 2° 2 gives additional cause to ap-
plaud needed measures it is now implementing based on its
priority/limited fund base, and to look forward to future
initiatives.
C. The Environmental Side Agreement
As this comment has developed during the last 15
months, NAFTA has faced setbacks, leading to expansion of
environmental provisions. During this period, there has been
much opposition to the creation of any form of an outside
Commission on environmental issues. The rationale was a
lack of belief that an environmental Commission would have
access to useful enforcement mechanisms. 20 3
Importantly, the Environmental Side Agreement signed
this fall is stronger than what the proponents of a Commis-
sion called for in their draft commission proposal of 1992.
The Side Agreement is designed to complement the already
existing, comprehensive provisions within NAFTA. In many
ways, in fact, the agreement reinforces provisions already im-
plemented by NAFTA.204 The Side Agreement was intended
by the Clinton Administration to respond to the criticism of
202. The National Wildlife Federation has recently reported that $674 mil-
lion (U.S.) is the latest amount committed to the Border Plan. Specifically, the
funds are to be directed to: river pollution reduction, wastewater treatment fa-
cilities, the construction of landfills and the purchase of equipment to treat haz-
ardous waste. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, NEWS 2 (Sept. 14, 1993).
203. In line with this enforcement criticism, many environmental organiza-
tions have proposed the creation of an international enforcement commission as
part of NAFTA. The role of the commission would be to have an international
panel comprised of governmental and leading non-governmental environmental
experts to coordinate and enforce harmonized environmental regulations for
the United States, Mexico and Canada. Proponents of such a commission argue
that without it, NAFTA inadequately addresses the impact this treaty will have
on the environment.
The largest problem with the Draft Proposal for a Commission on Trade
and the Environment is that it is devoid of any legitimate enforcement meas-
ures anyway. The strongest measures it can take beyond the inspections men-
tioned earlier is publishing in its report those who did not comply with the
commission-inspection findings. Thus, what the Commission concept really
comes down to is one more group giving recommendations to the already ex-
isting governmental agencies who do have, and do use the enforcement mecha-
nisms available to them.
204. See supra note 134-38 and accompanying text.
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NAFTA that it lacked adequate enforcement. 20 5 To this end,
among other things, the Secretariat and the Council of the
Commission have mechanisms independent of the respective
judiciaries to deal with alleged violations of the agreement by
the governments of each member.20 6 These mechanisms in-
clude panels that have the power to impose fines and estab-
lish tariffs.20 7 Additionally, the Side Agreement ensures
public involvement by establishing the Joint Public Advisory
Committee.208
There are however, two surviving criticisms to a Com-
mission or Side Agreement. The first is unavoidable with the
Side Agreement's existence: the added bureaucracy that it
will create. The second is that the substantive enforcement
framework created to address environmental violations is one
of tariffs: the antithesis of what NAFTA was supposed to be.
The only source of appeasement is that the process is so
lengthy that it arguably will encourage settlement rather
than reliance on tariffs.
D. NAFTA, The Side Agreement and the Border Plan:
Will They Work Together?
A frequent criticism of the Border Plan is that it does not
adequately confront one of its key purposes: protecting the
border region from the expansion NAFTA will bring.20 9 In
his comment to EPA in September of 1991, Mr. Justin Ward
wrote that, ".. . the draft border plan is silent on the prospect
of major trade liberalization under NAFTA."210 This is true,
to the extent that the Border Plan does state that it is to be
independent of NAFTA so that its programs would have pro-
ceeded even had NAFTA not come to fruition.21' The real
205. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 153-58 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 159-63 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 170-72 and accompanying text.
209. STATEMENT OF JUSTINE WARD, supra note 198, at 3.
210. Id.
211. See BORDER PLAN, supra note 12, at 1-5.
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problem is that no one is really sure what the effects of
NAFTA will be.212
A joint effort of EPA and the U.S. Trade Representative's
Office has formed two possible economic scenarios that may
result from NAFTA.213 These scenarios both hold varying ef-
fects on the environment. The first of these scenarios
predicts rapid economic growth in the border area because of
minimal economic risk to U.S. investors.214 The second sce-
nario suggests a desire for firms, with the new free trade sta-
tus, to locate increasingly further in the interior of Mexico to
be nearer to Mexican domestic markets.215 Under the first
scenario, NAFTA economic growth to the border region is pro-
jected at 6-17% per year over the next 10 years.216 Under the
second scenario, NAFTA impact on economic growth in the
border region is projected at 4-13% per year over the next 10
years.217
Under either scenario, there is going to be marked eco-
nomic growth to the border region. This article takes the po-
sitions that first, because of NAFTA, environmental
cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico has increased dra-
matically.218 Case in point of this are the joint efforts, finan-
cial commitments and substantive improvement plans
created by the Border Plan. Whether such plans and joint
cooperation would have been initiated at all had no NAFTA
been anticipated is a valid question.
Second, this article takes the position, that NAFTA eco-
nomic growth will generate more funds, which in turn will
allow for more money to be earmarked to stabilize the envi-
ronment and continue construction of necessary infrastruc-
212. Mark Alan Stamaty, Washingtoon, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 14, 1993,
at 22.
213. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
REVIEW OF U.S.-MEuco ENVIRONMENTAL IssuEs 66-68 (1992).
214. Id. at 66.
215. Id. at 68.
216. Id. at 67.
217. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
REVIEW OF U.S.-MExuco ENVIRONMENTAL IssuEs 68 (1992).
218. Id. at 70.
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ture.219 Considering Congressional unwillingness to spend
more at this time on necessary improvements, NAFTA could
inject the system with more funds that Congress may allocate
as it sees fit.
Moreover, due to the fact that the Side Agreement was
signed in September of 1993, after the completion of this arti-
cle, a full analysis of its potential impact was not considered
when the Review was written. Should reality conform to the
text of the Agreement, a fund for environmental improve-
ment and protection is to be created. Already, it has been
reported that the U.S. will contribute $4 billion to the
fund. 220
Appropriate to discuss at this point is whether or how
NAFTA and the Border Plan will effect the interior regions of
the three member states. Although NAFTA does provide sen-
sitive environmental provisions applicable to all parts of each
member state, if Mexico, the United States and Canada de-
sire to have a comprehensive environmental treaty with one
another, NAFTA is not the appropriate forum for it because
again, NAFTA is first and foremost an economic treaty.
Moreover, it is unlikely that such an environmental treaty
would ever happen because each state appropriately relies on
its own government to protect its own lands and population.
Moreover, the Environmental Side Agreement, in small mea-
sure, establishes a minor interrelationship between the envi-
ronmental policies of each member nation.
Multinational agreements like the Border Plan make the
clearest sense. This is because of the strong likelihood that
acts within one nation can impact a neighboring nation, par-
ticularly at the borders. For border regions, therefore, it is in
the nations' best interests to work together. Thus, the envi-
ronmental provisions of NAFTA, the Environmental Side
Agreement, and the Border Plan, short of an expansive envi-
ronmental treaty between the United States, Mexico and
219. Id. at 69.
220. Keith Schneider, Environmental Groups Are Split on Support for Free-
Trade Pact, THE N.Y. TmEs, Sept. 15, 1993, at Al.
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Canada, are as invasive into another's country's law and reg-
ulations as is appropriate.
Some have argued for a direct "green tax" on trade asso-
ciated with NAFTA to directly apply money generated from
the agreement to applicable environmental concerns. The
problems with this are clear. First, NAFTA is a free trade
agreement, and is designed to eliminate tariffs and trade bar-
riers. A "green tax" defeats NAFTA's very intent. Second,
taxation of this trade for a pre-determined specific purpose
seems contrary to the general U.S. policy of all tax dollars
generated going into a pool and allocated with respect to the
various programs needing funding. An equal protection prob-
lem could be found with such a "green tax".
Whether NAFTA, the Border Plan and the Environmen-
tal Side Agreement will adequately address the environmen-
tal consequences of NAFTA, whatever they are, will in large
part be based on the commitment of the U.S. and Mexican
governments. As stated earlier, a major criticism of the en-
tire Border Plan and Environmental Side Agreement process
is the lack of a definitive guarantee of the necessary funds to
ensure adequate environmental protection at the border.
This criticism is of course diminished with the recent $1.8 bil-
lion (U.S.) loan commitments of the World Bank, and recent
Border Plan funding of $674 million (U.S.) from Mexico and
the United States.221 NAFTA addresses environmental con-
cerns that result from economic activity. The Border Plan
provides the structure for environmental protection, and by
constantly being updated in stages, will be able to effectively
plan responses to economic growth associated with NAFTA.
The Environmental Side Agreement ensures public participa-
tion and strong enforcement to bolster existing NAFTA dis-
pute provisions.
The three agreements, together, provide a cohesive, or-
ganized and substantive plan to protecting the environment.
If the end hoped for is ecological preservation and responsible
221. World Bank, Mexico Sign Accord for Program; Border Loan Planned,
INT'L ENVTL. DAILY, (BNA) 1 (Sept. 29, 1993); NATIONAL WiLDLFE FEDERATION,
NEws 2 (Sept. 14, 1993).
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economic growth, NAFTA, the Environmental Side Agree-
ment and the Border Plan represent the furthest effort yet to
join these two past enemies. They provide for sustainable
economic growth that is not at the expense of our
environment.222
VI. Conclusion
A clear picture of a post-NAFTA environment is difficult
to ascertain. The Mexican Government has taken monumen-
tal measures in order to take part in this treaty. They have,
as their President recently said in an interview, "literally
taken food from the mouths of their children," in order to im-
prove their environmental standards. The 1988 Mexican En-
vironmental Law is a comprehensive one. Mexico's billion-
dollar commitment to Mexico proper and the Border Plan
over the next three years is an example of their sincerity in
achieving sustainable economic growth while being sensitive
to environmental issues.223
NAFTA is very sensitive to the environmental implica-
tions of free trade. The reason for NAFTA's environmental
sensitivity is not altruistic, but economic. A successful trade
agreement will not promote further economic growth unless
adequate public infrastructure is in place. If infrastructure
remained stagnant, at some point NAFTA-driven economic
growth would be held back by inadequate resources. There-
fore, both the U.S. and Mexico will benefit economically from
protecting the environment.
Those who are against NAFTA because of possible envi-
ronmental flaws in the agreement will probably never be
fully satisfied with any government proposal seeking to cre-
222. Environmental groups endorsing NAFTA include: Conservation Inter-
national, the National Audubon Society, the Environmental Defense Fund, the
National Wildlife Federation, the Natural Resources Defense Council and the
World Wildlife Fund. CONSERVATION INTERNATIONAL, NEWS RELEASE 2 (Sept.
14, 1993); NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, NEWS 1 (Sept. 14, 1993).
223. This figure includes the World Bank commitment of $1.8 billion (U.S.)
in bank loans, and Mexico's three year, $1.2 billion (U.S.) commitment over the
next three years. World Bank, Mexico Sign Accord For Program; Border Loan
Planned, IheL ENvTL. DAILY, (BNA) 1 (Sept. 29, 1993).
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ate free trade throughout North America. Absent NAFTA, it
is quite likely that the effort to promote environmental stabil-
ity in the border area through the Border Plan would not be
nearly as strong as it is now. With the creation of the Envi-
ronmental Side Agreement, those who oppose NAFTA on en-
vironmental grounds cannot deny the effort and substantive
results that have been achieved. As Mayor Susan Golding of
San Diego, California, a densely populated border region city
guaranteed to be economically and environmentally affected
by NAFTA, has stated, "This [NAFTA] is the greenest treaty
in the history of the world."224 These results include input
through the vocal role the agreement creates for non-govern-
mental persons or agencies, and a legitimate enforcement
mechanism. For the United States to go further would be ir-
responsible. Already, a valid argument can be made that the
United States has, to a degree, relinquished control over its
environmental policy. 225
Opponents of NAFTA who foresee the risk of American
businesses moving south where the environmental standards
are lower and the wages are cheaper, should consider looking
at the big picture. Were it not for the hope of NAFTA, the
more stringent Mexican environmental practices currently in
place likely would never have been implemented. Moreover,
absent NAFTA, given the incredible growth of the Maqui-
ladora industry, this practice would probably grow at a faster
rate because, absent NAFTA and the Border Plan, there
would be even more reason to move south.226
Until we raise the Mexican standard of living, both eco-
nomically and environmentally, United States workers will
always be at risk to the "temptation" of companies to move
south. Thus, it is in the United State's long term benefit to
help the Mexicans develop, and in turn promote joint eco-
nomic development.
224. Mayor Susan Golding, San Diego, California, This Week With David
Brinkley, ABC News, Transcript #625, 4 (Oct. 17, 1993).
225. Caspar W. Weinberger, NAFTA . . . Free Trade or Demagoguery?,
FORBES MAG. 37 (Oct. 18, 1993).
226. Many companies will never move south because rebuilding their infra-
structure would be too costly, no matter what the savings in labor.
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In October of 1993, I had a discussion with an employee
of the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission.
This person was confident that if a pollster went to Juarez,
the Mexican sister-city to El Paso, Texas, and asked the pop-
ulation whether they would prefer clean air or a new manu-
facturing plant, that the latter would be the overwhelming
choice.227 The reason is simple. Clearly, the choice they
would be making in choosing the plant is bad for themselves
and the environment they live in. Many Mexicans, particu-
larly those in the industrial blue collar sector who will be
most affected by NAFTA, do not have the economic stability
necessary to ensure that their children are fed, let alone
breathe clean air and drink clean water.
Right now the Mexican government is performing a bal-
ancing act of great difficulty. While the Mexican economy
has greatly improved over recent years, the government has
sacrificed even greater immediate economic growth for its
people to improve the environmental conditions required by
NAFTA. They have done this because they know that
NAFTA will ultimately promote not only significant economic
growth for its people, but environmental stability as well.
Not until the Mexicans develop an improved standard of liv-
ing can the average Mexican citizen truly afford to choose the
environment before their immediate survival. NAFTA is the
mechanism to create the economic stability Mexico needs.
NAFTA is the mechanism that will rid the United States of
the ever-present fear of jobs going south. It is to the United
States' long term benefit to help the Mexicans develop, and in
turn promote joint-economic development.
NAFTA has set an environmental standard in conjunc-
tion with the Border Plan that no future United States trade
agreement will ever be without. It may not save the planet,
but it is certainly and substantively moving in the right
direction.228
227. Interview of Anonymous, Texas Natural Resource Conservation Com-
mission (Oct. 9, 1993).
228. Work on this comment was concluded in December of 1993, after
NAFTA's successful signing into law.
46http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/9
